A user on a network with two or more linked UnrealIRCd servers can turn a reply tag into a command executed with server authority. CISA added the flaw, CVE-2026-114713, to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on November 13. If you run a linked IRC network, the risk starts at the user-facing service, even when the user has no server credentials.

The CVE Program record identifies the labeled-response module in UnrealIRCd 6.0.0 through releases before 6.2.7.1. It says the module “does not escape the IRCv3 “label” message tag when echoing it into replies”. An attacker can supply a tag whose delimiters are interpreted as server-to-server commands when the reply travels between linked servers. Those commands then run with server authority rather than the permissions of the user who supplied the tag. The authority gained is IRC server authority; investigate any resulting server-side changes on linked nodes.

The CNA describes the attack condition as “two or more linked servers” and says any user on that network can trigger the injection. An IRC operator may have locked down administrative accounts and still have ordinary users on a linked network who can supply the affected tag. Map the links first; inventory each linked server’s installed UnrealIRCd version and whether labeled-response is loaded. Include private or internal servers in that inventory when they share the affected network.

The affected routine is labeled_response_mtag_is_ok() in src/modules/labeled-response.c. IRCv3 labels let clients correlate replies to requests. Here the module echoes the client-supplied label into a reply that crosses a server boundary, and delimiter handling lets the user’s text acquire server-command meaning. The CNA scores the flaw 8.6 under CVSS 3.1, with changed scope and high integrity impact. CISA lists this flaw as exploited, so prioritize the linked fleet.

Fix each server in the network

The CNA’s remediation is to upgrade to UnrealIRCd 6.2.7.1 or later. It also gives operators an in-place alternative: the bundle-20261107 hot-patch, applied through UnrealIRCd’s hot-patch subcommand. Use that route when an immediate restart would disrupt the network, and record which servers received it. After rollout, check the running release or applied patch state on each linked server.

Until you can patch, add blacklist-module "labeled-response"; to the configuration on all servers in the network. That workaround removes the affected module and its labeled-reply behavior, so coordinate the client feature impact before applying it. Reload or restart as required by your deployment procedure, then confirm the module is absent everywhere and the links remain healthy. A partial rollout leaves the unpatched linked server in scope.

CISA sets a November 16 due date for covered agencies and calls for forensic triage under its KEV entry. For a network you suspect was abused, preserve server and link logs, look for unauthorized server-side changes or commands around user activity, and bring the results to incident response. Use each server’s command and configuration history to trace changes across the linked network.

Verify the linked fleet

List the servers joined by each IRC network link and their deployed releases. Bring every affected linked server to 6.2.7.1 or later, apply bundle-20261107, or keep labeled-response blacklisted across that network while scheduling the permanent fix. Verify the running version or patch state and loaded-module state per server, then confirm links and ordinary IRC replies still work. The expected state is a fixed build or patch, or a disabled module, at both ends of every healthy link.