Attackers entered vulnerable Check Point Security Gateways through their Mobile Access portals, gained root, installed persistent gateway malware and reached a VMware ESXi host where they ran a file wiper. Check Point Research’s November 12 investigation traces that chain from attacks beginning October 30. The entry point was PHP2Shell, associated with CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619; the local root escalation was CVE-2026-123039.

The first wave targeted Israeli organizations and included destructive activity at some targets. A November 2 wave scanned organizations in multiple countries and sectors; Check Point observed no destructive activity in that later wave. On each exposed gateway, check portal sessions and crash records, then map SSH reachability to ESXi hosts. Check Point’s investigation documents that route through a compromised gateway.

Mobile Access opened the gateway

The Mobile Access portal runs Apache and PHP on the gateway. The PHP project’s record for CVE-2026-109618 describes request-memory corruption after an out-of-memory exit; its record for CVE-2026-109619 describes global state left pointing to freed request memory. Both permit remote code execution under the conditions in those records. In Check Point’s investigated sequence, portal compromise was the first step, followed by a separate privilege escalation on the appliance.

Check Point found PHP session files under /opt/CPcvpn-R81.20/tmp/ containing upload_progress_pwn. Its portal Apache/PHP workers also produced hundreds of segmentation faults in the same attack window. Repeated worker faults alongside the session marker distinguish the observed attack window from a lone worker crash. Preserve both records when triaging exposed gateways. The initial activity came from 130.94.19[.]204; the research also lists 130.94.19[.]168 as an indicator. Search the corresponding canonical addresses in retained network telemetry and correlate matches with portal sessions, worker crashes and the service in use.

Root access seeded gateway persistence

The Check Point-assigned CVE-2026-123039 record describes a root-running DynamicCLI daemon accepting commands on the world-writable local socket /tmp/dynamic_socket without checking the connecting process. Its listed affected systems include Quantum Security Gateway as well as Quantum Security Management at R82.10 Jumbo Hotfix Take 50 or below, R82.20 Take 10 or below, R82 Take 130 or below, and R81.20 Take 173 or below. The Check Point support notice identifies the same local root-escalation issue. A compromised portal process gave the attacker the local foothold needed to use that flaw in the investigated gateway.

With root access, the attacker put PHP webshells in Mobile Access login-page templates, including files matching zz*.tpl and challenge_render.tpl. An expanded shell used the hardcoded key zz2026 and saved uploads at /tmp/.up.tpl. Hunt for the template names, key and upload path on exposed gateways. Check Point then tracked TSGA, initially staged as /tmp/CPconfigdaemon and relaunched as slot_CPconfigdaemon in a boot-persistence directory. Its embedded TSProxy component was written to /lib/libcpfwcommon.so and loaded into appliance processes to handle selected connections while ordinary traffic continued. A temporary output file, /tmp/.bd.log, is another lead for investigators. Check Point also found TSGA capable of collecting appliance configuration and tampering with firewall logs. Preserve off-appliance logs and configuration snapshots when investigating these artifacts.

Destruction moved onto ESXi

“The attackers pivoted from the gateway to a VMware ESXi host over SSH,” Check Point Research reports. They authenticated as vpxuser, staged the destroy_v6 Linux wiper and executed it on the host. The wiper traversed target directories, overwrote files with zeros by default before deletion, and wrote DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt notes. The research lists a wiper hash under the spelling destory_v6: c7d9477309fac6c638a1128442056a242de086996add8cb49cd6496c36003237. Keep both spellings when comparing incident records.

Check Point links TSGA and TSProxy to the PhiliKit toolset by shared code and cryptographic material, but leaves the operator and motive open. The gogo scanner, hash 3b51080a909023f7d484e2443740b572307ce0054eb9e32d98f0a06bfcd2db90, was also deployed on the gateway to look for internal services.

Contain the gateway and ESXi route

Prioritize Security Gateways exposing Mobile Access. Record each appliance’s Gaia branch and installed Jumbo Hotfix Take, then obtain the applicable Check Point fix for the portal and DynamicCLI from vendor support. The PHP project’s fixed upstream releases, 8.2.35, 8.3.36, 8.4.27 and 8.5.12, describe PHP itself; use Check Point’s appliance-specific treatment to verify the deployed gateway. Restrict Mobile Access exposure to required users and paths while scheduling remediation. Limit SSH reachability from gateways to ESXi hosts to what operations require, and review vpxuser authentication from gateway addresses.

For gateways that were exposed in the attack window, preserve portal sessions, worker-crash records and login-page templates before changing them. Investigate upload_progress_pwn, zz*.tpl, challenge_render.tpl, slot_CPconfigdaemon, /lib/libcpfwcommon.so and the initial TSGA staging path. The reported webshell SHA-256 is edb3e92eb7bda7413a09edcc4b1ba3cbed4bcdf42808a8abce63b6e4c3fda2b3; the persistent TSGA executable is 4171b521fa6441382aa2fa014a08e18ff9a6e0ab6096c9144072bf46b37a2ec8, and its initial executable is d7549671c7189979f0624ec52dad9ea6a707d23146e3585ab8f8c4720eca0c63. Correlate those leads with ESXi SSH sessions, wiper activity and DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt on hosts reachable from a suspect gateway.

Verify the installed vendor-approved gateway treatment and the intended gateway-to-ESXi SSH policy. Handle any matching implant or ESXi artifact as an incident requiring containment and recovery. The portal fix addresses initial access; removing an established foothold and checking downstream hosts are separate jobs.