CISA added CVE-2026-115731 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on November 17. The flaw sits in the report-processing code used by Puppet Server in affected Puppet Enterprise releases. A client holding a CA-signed agent certificate can submit a crafted report and run arbitrary code as the Puppet Server service user.

The certificate requirement is the first question for operators. CISA says the attack works with “any CA-signed agent certificate”; where a certificate authority automatically signs requests without strong verification, an unauthenticated network attacker can obtain one. The Perforce-authored CVE record names fixed Puppet Enterprise releases and explicitly calls for a Puppet Server restart after the upgrade. CISA gives December 1 as the KEV remediation due date for covered federal agencies.

How a report reaches server code

Puppet agents submit reports to Puppet Server. In the affected releases, the server’s report-processing code deserializes untrusted rich data. A client with a CA-signed agent certificate can put a crafted rich-data type in a report and submit it via an HTTP PUT request; the vulnerable code then permits execution with the server service user’s privileges. CISA’s classification also lists CWE-502 for untrusted deserialization and CWE-94 for improper code generation.

Perforce rates the vulnerability Critical at 9.4 under CVSS 4.0. Its vector lists a network attack, low privileges and no user interaction, with high confidentiality, integrity and availability impact for the affected server and subsequent systems. A valid agent certificate supplies the access condition behind that low-privilege rating. In a deployment that autosigns without strong verification, obtaining that certificate can itself be a network step. Give the report-receiving Puppet Server the priority of a central control-plane service, especially where agent certificates are broadly distributed.

There are two routes to the certificate prerequisite. A holder of an existing CA-signed agent certificate already satisfies it. On an installation that autosigns requests without strong verification, a network attacker can acquire a certificate and then reach the same report-processing flaw. Strong verification before automatic certificate signing prevents an unauthenticated network attacker from getting a certificate through that route; the fixed server release protects the report handler against clients that already hold certificates.

Perforce names three fixed releases

Perforce’s CNA record marks Puppet Enterprise 2023.8.0 up to but excluding 2023.8.13, 2025.0.0 up to but excluding 2025.12.1, and 2026.0.0 up to but excluding 2026.0.1 as affected. It lists 2023.8.13, 2025.12.1, and 2026.0.1 as unaffected, and describes the default version status as affected. Verify the installed release against the relevant branch, including older or otherwise unlisted builds, rather than assuming an omitted version is safe.

The vendor’s remediation in that record is to upgrade to a release bundling puppet-agent 8.22.2 or 9.1.3, specifically one of those fixed Puppet Enterprise releases, and restart puppet server so the fixed code loads. The bundled agent version is part of the release description; the repair targets the server processing reports. Confirm the running server was restarted after the upgrade, not merely that a package was installed.

Locate certificate and report exposure

Identify Puppet Servers receiving agent reports, their installed Puppet Enterprise release, and which agents have CA-signed certificates. Review how each server’s certificate authority approves signing requests. Require strong verification for automatic signing or move to a verified approval process where that requirement cannot be met. Restrict network access to the report endpoint to agents that need it while scheduling the server upgrade. These exposure checks focus on the path CISA describes; an already valid agent certificate still makes the patched server essential.

For suspected exploitation, preserve Puppet Server request, report and certificate-signing records, and seek vendor-supported detection guidance before filtering on a crafted-report signature. Use the installed-release inventory to drive the immediate upgrade decision. CISA directs covered agencies to follow its risk-based patching and forensic-triage guidance and to evaluate each asset’s internet exposure. Its December 1 deadline applies to covered federal agencies; prioritize the upgrade of a reachable Puppet Server now.

For cloud services, CISA’s KEV action directs covered agencies to follow applicable BOD 26-04 guidance or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable. Where a provider operates Puppet Server, establish who owns the Puppet Enterprise upgrade, who restarts the server process and how your team will verify the running release. A provider’s package-installation notice leaves the same operational question as an on-premises upgrade: has the report-processing service loaded the fixed code? Record the provider’s answer alongside the installed-release inventory so the report-receiving instance stays in the remediation plan.

Confirm the server loaded the fix

On each report-receiving Puppet Server, check the installed Puppet Enterprise release against the fixed branch releases, then confirm the server process restarted after the upgrade. Inspect CA signing policy and issued agent certificates to understand who can reach that report path. For a server with automatic signing, require strong verification before new certificates are issued. The expected post-change state is a running fixed Puppet Server and a certificate-approval path that grants certificates only to verified agents. An unpatched server remains exposed to any client that already holds a valid CA-signed agent certificate.