COLD RELIC stole a US organization’s Google Workspace staff directory and cloud files in late 2025. In 2026, an operator impersonated an employee of that organization in a secure-messaging conversation with someone at a second US organization. The conversation led to a phishing link, stolen Microsoft Entra ID credentials, and bulk downloads from the second organization’s cloud drive. Google Threat Intelligence Group and Mandiant’s case study connects the two investigations; the researchers assess that information taken in the first intrusion likely helped the attackers choose and approach the second target.

The second organization used Entra ID to sign people in to Google Workspace. That made the messaging pretext an identity problem across two providers: the attacker needed a credible human introduction, then access to the federated sign-in account. GTIG reports evidence of new COLD RELIC phishing operations in November 2026. The group’s previous names include COLDRIVER and UNC4057; the US Justice Department assesses it operates within Russia’s FSB, according to GTIG.

Stolen Workspace admin credentials opened access

In the late-2025 incident, COLD RELIC used stolen Super Admin credentials and a series of MFA push requests. The account owner eventually accepted one. The attacker signed in through a US residential proxy near the victim’s location, then enrolled a device model new to the tenant. Local-looking network traffic could blend with the user’s normal sign-ins; the new authenticator was the more durable clue.

The compromised administrator shared cloud-drive files to an attacker-operated email account and downloaded files directly. The operator also exported employee lists and initiated a tenant-wide Google Workspace Customer Takeout export. That administrative export differs from an employee’s personal Google Takeout; look for CUSTOMER_TAKEOUT_CREATED in Admin audit records. GTIG says the operator queried security investigation and email logs and viewed, changed, and deleted Alert Center notifications. Its detection table also names Batch Delete Operation Performed for alert deletion and User List Download for directory exports.

Months of access gave COLD RELIC more than files. It retained attacker-enrolled passkeys, MFA backup codes and rogue devices, synced mail to external clients through OAuth, and searched cloud storage for credentials, personnel information and email archives such as .pst files. In GTIG’s words, the group obtains “access to strategic personnel rosters and operational documents” and uses those materials to approach contacts. After removal from the first tenant, operators used accounts impersonating its employees to contact people in the same professional circles.

Impersonated staff reached the second organization

At the second US organization, an attacker posing as an employee from the first victim organization began a conversation in an encrypted messaging app. Phishing links in that conversation led to credential and authentication-token theft for Entra ID, with relevant document lures after the redirect. Mandiant observed the Entra ID account compromise, registration of a new MFA device, and bulk downloads of files available to the compromised user in Google Workspace.

A redirector from this intrusion was submitted to VirusTotal in June 2026 with a query parameter referring to the first organization. GTIG describes compromised websites used as redirectors that can fingerprint visitors before sending selected people to phishing pages. In this case, the stolen relationship context is the researchers’ assessment; the observed impersonation and account activity are the concrete events to investigate. Mandiant investigated the two linked US organizations.

Find the sign-in, then the durable access

Start with privileged Workspace identities and Entra ID accounts that federate into Workspace, especially accounts contacted through a partner or former colleague. Correlate repeated MFA challenges followed by success with new device or passkey enrollment. Google’s Login Audit Activity Events reference documents login_challenge, login_failure, login_success, login_challenge_method, login_challenge_status, and backup_code as event names, fields or values for a Workspace login review. Check Entra ID sign-in and authentication-method registration records on the federated side. GTIG also calls for residential-proxy reputation and sudden residential ASN changes on privileged sign-ins; geographic proximity alone is weak reassurance here.

Follow a suspect login through Workspace Admin audit events for CUSTOMER_TAKEOUT_CREATED, User List Download, Investigation Query and Batch Delete Operation Performed. In Drive logs, check unusual bursts of Download events and Visibility changed to shared_externally or user-sharing permission changes. Review new Authorize events granting broad mail scope to an unapproved email client, plus unexpected Device Registered and Passkey enrolled events. Compare the timing with employee-directory access and messages that claim to come from that organization. Legitimate administrators can perform exports; an unfamiliar device, fresh authenticator and bulk download around the same sign-in give the events their context.

Revoke the credentials that outlive passwords

For a suspected account compromise, remove unauthorized passkeys, backup codes and MFA devices in both identity providers. Revoke active browser sessions, refresh tokens and unauthorized third-party OAuth grants across Workspace and Entra ID, then reset credentials. GTIG describes one victim that reset passwords while leaving existing sessions alive; the attacker kept access. Move administrators from push approvals to phishing-resistant FIDO2/WebAuthn security keys and require an administrator or out-of-band identity check to approve new authenticators.

Test the response on a controlled account: invalidate its sessions and refresh tokens in both providers, remove a test authenticator and a test OAuth grant, then attempt the former sign-in and app access. Each should require fresh authorized authentication; a retained session or grant means the playbook needs another revocation step. For the real incident, preserve the Admin, Drive, OAuth and Entra ID records before changing access, and warn contacts whose names or relationship data were exposed. A password change that leaves a passkey or session in place lets this operator return after the account looks clean.