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Claude Ports WAGO PLC Exploit and Bricks Test Controller

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What a defender needs to know

Forescout researchers used Claude Code to port a pre-authentication CVE-2021-31886 exploit from a WAGO 750-852 to a 750-831 running firmware V01.04.16. The final remote-code-execution stage took 8 hours and 32 minutes and $535.74 in API usage. A later implant attempt wrote into flash-mapped memory and permanently bricked the test controller.

The successful path sent an oversized FTP USER command, replaced the reference exploit’s QUIT with CWD, and omitted the normal CRLF terminator so the shellcode buffer survived long enough to run. Working payloads sent ICMP echo requests and a UDP packet containing PWNED. The test required an existing exploit, firmware, tools, physical hardware and sustained researcher guidance; Forescout did not report malicious use of the port.

Forescout says the tested V01.04.16 build was covered by the original advisory, while the current CERT@VDE page lists 750-831/000-00x firmware through FW14. Confirm the model and firmware with WAGO or CERT@VDE before treating a controller as outside the affected range.

Inventory WAGO 750-series controllers and identify systems reachable over FTP on TCP port 21. Look for oversized USER values, unusual USER-to-CWD sequences, missing terminators, repeated crashes or reboots, and new ICMP or UDP traffic. Preserve network and device evidence and coordinate with the process owner before active testing because a malformed attempt can stop or damage the controller.

Restrict FTP, Telnet and web administration to approved engineering systems through the OT zone. Test from an authorized management segment. The expected result is no TCP port 21 reachability without a documented operational need, no management access from unapproved hosts and no unexplained outbound controller traffic.

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