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Ransomware Server Exposes Credential Theft and EDR-Killer Toolkit

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1-minute read

What a defender needs to know

A server associated with The Gentlemen ransomware operation exposed the full TukTuk command-and-control project, EDR-killer research, Jira data assessed as stolen from a technology company, and infrastructure credentials associated with a healthcare company. Oasis Security found separate Windows and Linux agents, a backend, and a panel that could execute commands, move files, capture screens, control processes, and display a fake Windows Security prompt to collect credentials.

The same server held 224 Jira tickets and eight attachments, plus cloud and infrastructure credentials. Oasis did not disclose the organizations or quantify TukTuk infections, and it published no responses from the affected parties.

Search for 65[.]109[.]70[.]162, borjumaniya[.]store, TukTuk.exe, tuktuk-v2.0_10.zip, eb.sys, and the Greenshot.exe plus malicious log4net.dll side-loading pair. Preserve context around every match.

SHA-256 values:

  • eb.sys: 97BD65E98CDC4E93D49EDD4EA905D43A61244DF0FD3323E6649330DE3B1BE091
  • TukTuk.exe: e2b31ac7ee077b26332444a83a68ab75be641113e7d86979d844a0f3478f01f9
  • Archive: e74088419de2e5b47b1889f2ba1369cb4b436405ce03cf07da452791681f9923
  • log4net.dll: 096ec37870eb401793592c9b53b5b52fc7a70b113bc2d9cd3f53231142d6c584

The report provides recognition evidence, not a complete containment or recovery procedure. Correlate hits with process ancestry, file paths, signer data, network destinations, and authentication activity before defining incident scope.

Review nearby credential prompts, screenshot requests, shell activity, and process-control events to distinguish a published sample match from an active intrusion sequence.

Primary sources