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What a defender needs to know
TantoSec published a working unauthenticated code-execution chain for the RadAsyncUpload control in Progress Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX. Releases 2010.1.309 through 2026.2.519 are affected under specific non-default conditions; Progress fixed the chain in 2026.2.708. The researchers report no confirmed exploitation in the wild, and neither primary source quantified exposed deployments.
The exploit uses different decrypt and JSON-parse behavior, or a slower timing difference, as a padding oracle. It forges encrypted upload metadata, controls AsyncUploadTypeName, and loads a mixed-mode DLL inside w3wp.exe. A stronger custom Telerik encryption key does not prevent the attack because the key is never recovered or guessed.
Inventory Telerik.Web.UI.dll, reachable RadAsyncUpload pages, server-side use of the upload result, and Telerik.AsyncUpload.ConfigurationEncryptionKey. Upgrade exposed applications to 2026.2.708 or later. Where an immediate upgrade is impossible and RadAsyncUpload is unnecessary, set Telerik.Web.DisableAsyncUploadHandler to true.
Review telemetry for w3wp.exe spawning unexpected children, mixed-mode DLLs loaded from upload temporary or App_Data locations, and unexplained .aspx files in the web root. Preserve process and module evidence before recycling the application pool because memory-only execution can avoid a web-shell file. The expected result is a fixed build or disabled handler, a working approved upload path, uniform rejection of altered client state, and no unexplained post-exploit activity.