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What a defender needs to know
UNC3569 exploited CVE-2026-51990 by sending a crafted sgbiz: link to a Windows system with Sogou Input Method. The link made biz_helper.exe pass unchecked arguments to SGMyInput.exe, whose skin-center webview loaded an attacker page in Chromium 80.0.3987.163. With the sandbox disabled, a CVE-2021-38003 V8 exploit ran shellcode with the current user’s rights.
The shellcode staged 7z.exe, malicious 7z.dll, and encrypted payload p under C:\Users\Public\Documents\, then sideloaded GRAYRABBIT. Current-campaign indicators include noht1ng[.]top, 8.218.50[.]207, and raw TCP 443 to mail.uaiubifas[.]top.
Tencent distributed the fix through Sogou’s automatic updater in version 16.3.0.3498. The evidence does not show that attackers compromised that update channel. The patch validates URL arguments at biz_helper.exe, while the embedded browser remains old, unsandboxed, and stripped of web-security controls.
Verify every managed Sogou installation is 16.3.0.3498 or later. On systems that ran older builds, search EDR for biz_helper.exe launching SGMyInput.exe with -page=skincenter and -url, followed by SGWebRender.exe; also search for the staged files and network indicators. An updated version prevents the published entry path but does not remove an implant installed earlier.
Confirm software inventory returns no build below 16.3.0.3498. Search retained EDR and network telemetry for the published process sequence, staged file paths, hashes, domains, address, and raw-TCP sequence. Treat any match as compromise evidence even if the endpoint has since updated: the patch blocks the published entry route but does not remove an implant already installed. Proxy-only logging can miss the reported raw TCP on port 443 because it is not HTTPS.