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What a defender needs to know
Huntress observed a ScreenConnect guest push update_224ac089.bat to an MSP technician’s host client on November 12. The client ran it without a prompt; within roughly nine seconds a rogue WindowsUpdate.WindowsClient.exe connected to an attacker relay at masterdarky[.]com on port 8041. This is exploitation of the client-side authorization flaw CVE-2026-84869, which ConnectWise fixed in 26.6.5. Huntress separately counted 688,000 guest “run file” requests across 42 MSP servers from 29 IPs since October 20. The count measures guest requests across servers; workstation execution requires host-side process evidence.
Check server connection history for each technician’s actual host-client build. Update on-prem clients and Access agents to at least 26.6.5; cloud operators should reinstall each host client and bring Access agents up to date as ConnectWise advises. If deployment must wait, remove TransferFiles from assigned session groups under Administration > Security > Roles for each role. That permission change is temporary.
On a copy of App_Data\Session.db, correlate guest RanFiles (EventType 85) and SentFiles (86) where ProcessType is 2 with a host connection (ProcessType 1). For overlaps, inspect technician process history for ScreenConnect launching files from Documents\*\Temp\, and look for %LOCALAPPDATA%\wclient_<8hex>, %TEMP%\wupdate_<8hex>.msi, and an unauthorized relay connection. A guest request outside the host connection window may never have reached the technician. Isolate a workstation with executed guest files, remove rogue access, and rotate credentials it could reach. Confirm the current client build and reconstruct historical overlaps before clearing the exposure.