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Remus Malware Stores Command Server Addresses in Ethereum Contracts

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What a defender needs to know

Remus, a 64-bit information stealer derived from Lumma, is using an Ethereum smart contract as a resilient directory for its command infrastructure. The technique, known as EtherHiding, lets an infected host retrieve the next destination through legitimate blockchain infrastructure instead of embedding one easy-to-block command-server address.

Unit 42 traced one delivery chain from interaction-gated JavaScript on an attacker-controlled CloudFront distribution to a fake transfer page and password-protected archive. The archive contains a Go loader; its presence shows staging, while process and network evidence are needed to establish execution. After execution, Remus can query contract 0x999941b74F6bbc921D5174A5b29911562cd2D7CF through the legitimate eth.llamarpc.com service before targeting browser credentials, cookies, live sessions, password-manager data, and wallets. ANY.RUN listed Remus-tagged sandbox observations through August 11. That is not proof of a new victim or campaign.

Hunt the sequence: an unexpected installer or Go loader executes, queries the exact contract through the legitimate RPC service, reaches a newly resolved destination, and accesses or injects into a browser before outbound traffic. Preserve process, DNS, proxy, endpoint, browser, and identity logs, then revoke sessions and rotate readable secrets. Confirm that revoked sessions do not reappear and that no unexplained sign-in, token use, account change, or new session follows the exposure window after clean-device rotation.

The blockchain lookup is only the address book. The harm sits in the accounts the stealer could still use after the endpoint goes quiet.

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