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Microsoft Power BI phishing plants two rogue ScreenConnect clients

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What a defender needs to know

A Power BI report link in an Outlook phishing message sent targets to an attacker-controlled landing page and a delayed ScreenConnect installer. Huntress observed two rogue clients, and in one incident a scheduled task that ran a repair script every two minutes. It saw the same delivery route on a handful of endpoints from September 10 and separately matched one client’s configuration on 22 other endpoints across incidents. Its SOC stopped one observed chain.

The lure used the legitimate app.powerbi.com domain; the installer came from the attacker-operated hamham27.screenconnect.com tenant. Search browser and endpoint records for the installer ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.exe, ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe service hashes 5956f9afb3ba610c38b2cfda88dd15be98783963769a12020c93ce05e749b3c3 and f048400c23add8c75abe189393d33c873c02c74eeaf43d47b950c8d643763b35, connections to instance-g01s1n-relay.screenconnect.com and onthegotree[.]site, plus SCAutoFix.ps1 and SCAutoRepairEvery2Min. The first client was uninstalled in one incident after it established the second, so finding only one installed client misses the other path. A downloaded installer identifies exposure; service activity and connections identify established access.

Contain affected endpoints, remove both unauthorized clients and the recurring task, and restrict remote-management software to approved tenants. Compare installed services, task state and outbound destinations against your RMM inventory after containment and again after the task’s two-minute interval. A clean comparison gives you a practical verification test; a renewed task or connection calls for more response work.

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