1-minute read
What a defender needs to know
An attacker put JavaScript into Optimizely Web Experimentation customer projects, and sites served the modified project snippets to visitors. StepSecurity identifies 178 affected organizations. Its analysis found a wallet-address swapper, a form-card skimmer and an iOS second-stage loader. Optimizely says it fixed the vulnerability, removed injected code and secured affected accounts.
The loader lived in Project JavaScript, a field that runs on pages using that project. Some snippets were served from customers’ own domains. One loader version decoded its destination with atob() and another carried an inline payload, so search each project’s field and its historical revisions rather than relying on a text search for 1688360 or a DNS block. Compare a fresh served snippet with the cleaned field. The expected result is no loader or inline payload in either place.
Search DNS, proxy and CSP records back to 04:00 UTC on November 16 for 1688360[.]cc and webshell[.]lol; check first-party snippet traffic too. Review project users, API tokens and signup records for impersonated accounts; ask Optimizely which projects and accounts were modified. The vendor says attackers abused signup rather than stolen credentials. If checkout pages used affected projects, preserve browser and payment evidence and work with the processor on exposed cards. Confirm copied wallet destinations on a trusted screen. Triage iOS visits separately; a visit alone is not a confirmed device compromise.
