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Attackers use MSP360 and ScreenConnect to keep access after phishing

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1-minute read

What a defender needs to know

Attackers used phishing lures to deliver a signed MSP360 RMM v2.5.0.67 installer under business-document and software-update names, then used its agent to install ConnectWise ScreenConnect on affected Windows endpoints. Microsoft’s September 29 report describes July campaigns across industries and follow-on credential-access and collection activity. Microsoft observed abuse of legitimate remote support products, rather than exploitation of a ScreenConnect flaw. Separate July activity also used FaronicsDeployAgent.exe to install ScreenConnect. Denied or abandoned User Account Control elevation stopped the observed MSP360 installation before its persistent services appeared.

In Defender XDR, use Microsoft’s DeviceFileEvents hash hunt for 108ef7e628d7a20bd6241a5b57149e27a6061f467123eb64061975559f8f73dc, then correlate RMM.Agent.exe starting PowerShell with ClientSetup.msi, ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe, and ScreenConnect network connections. The published queries use a 30-day lookback; extend the investigation with retained endpoint records for July. ScreenConnect activity at adswre[.]cfd or swedcorry[.]stefneyv[.]com merits service and session review. Compare both installed agents with your support roster, then investigate RunFile activity and transferred tools such as WebBrowserPassView.exe before deciding whether credential access occurred on that host.

Restrict unapproved remote-management agents with Application Control for Windows or AppLocker publisher rules, and enable MFA for approved RMM deployments where supported. For unauthorized installs, Microsoft recommends resetting the installing account’s password. Verify that both unauthorized services and their connections have stopped; follow credential-access findings through your incident response process before returning the device to service.

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