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Keyv's Signed npm Releases Carried a Credential-Stealing Worm

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1-minute read

What a defender needs to know

Attackers used a compromised maintainer GitHub account to publish malicious releases across the Keyv package family on August 4. The releases added a preinstall hook that ran setup.mjs, downloaded Bun 1.3.13, and executed a 728 KB payload named Math_Symbol.js. Because the attacker changed the source and released it through GitHub Actions, the npm packages carried valid provenance.

The payload harvested npm, GitHub, AWS, Kubernetes, Vault, Stripe, Slack, SSH, Terraform, Docker, VPN, IDE, and other secrets. It encrypted the bundle, uploaded it to public GitHub repositories described as Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again, and could use stolen maintainer access to infect more packages. Aikido counted at least 434 packages across 1,381 versions during the active incident.

Search lockfiles, caches, build logs, SBOMs, and endpoint telemetry for the affected versions and the filenames setup.mjs, Math_Symbol.js, or math_init.js. An affected lockfile is a scope lead; a lifecycle execution on a workstation or runner is the credential-exposure threshold.

Revoke and rotate every credential reachable from that execution context, invalidate sessions, remove attacker-created repositories and workflows, and review package releases made with exposed publishing access. Verify that affected versions are absent, exposed identities have been secured, persistence and propagation paths are removed, and post-rotation monitoring shows no unexplained use.

Preserve the original runner, registry, and identity evidence until every downstream publication and cloud action is explained.

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