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JSCeal Replays Browser Sessions to Steal Fresh Google Tokens

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1-minute read

What a defender needs to know

Check Point Research recovered JSCeal code that rebuilds a victim’s Google browser session and obtains a fresh OAuth token. The malware enumerates Chrome, Edge, Brave, Opera, Opera GX, Avast Secure Browser, Vivaldi, and Cốc Cốc profiles, then collects cookies, passwords, sessions, and tokens. It launches a Puppeteer headless browser, injects stolen cookies, uses recovered passwords against the legitimate accounts.google.com service, and reads the resulting user_id and oauth_token cookies.

The Windows chain pairs a bundled Node.js runtime with the Brotli-compressed app.jsc payload. Supporting files include node.zip, build.zip, preflight.js, winpty-agent.exe, and winpty.dll. The bundled node.exe preloads preflight.js through its separate -r flag, then runs app.jsc. Check Point’s static pipeline produced analyzable output for all 23 payloads in its main evaluation, though the report did not quantify infections or successful account takeovers.

Search endpoint and PowerShell telemetry for those files and the preload command, then pivot to unusual Node.js children, hidden Base64-decoding PowerShell, reads of Chromium Local State, browser launches with --user-data-dir= or --profile-directory=, and a local proxy listener on 127.0.0.1. Treat accounts.google.com as an abused legitimate service in this chain.

Isolate confirmed hosts, preserve the staged archives and process tree, and revoke Google sessions and OAuth tokens. Reset passwords from a trusted device and review identity telemetry for new sign-ins, tokens, or grants during the exposure window. Account for cryptocurrency wallets, Telegram sessions, and other browser-held secrets on the same endpoint. The source does not supply one universal recovery test, so endpoint restoration and identity invalidation require separate evidence.

Primary sources