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What a defender needs to know
A type confusion in isolated-vm lets guest JavaScript corrupt memory in the Node.js host process. ExternalCopy reads a transferList twice: an accessor can return a valid ArrayBuffer during validation and an attacker-selected value during an unchecked second cast. Researchers demonstrated a controlled-address crash and host control-flow hijacking.
Guest reachability requires one ivm.Reference, the ordinary bridge used to expose host capabilities to a sandbox. The V8 Isolate boundary itself held; the C++ marshaling layer failed. The sources report no active exploitation and do not quantify vulnerable deployments.
Upgrade isolated-vm 6.x to at least 6.2.0 and 7.x to at least 7.0.1. Move older branches to a maintained fixed line. Inventory each Node.js service, worker image, and build context with npm ls isolated-vm --all, then find runners that expose an ivm.Reference or accept a caller-influenced transferList. Retain the resolved dependency tree, lockfile entry, deployed image digest, service identity, and code-search results as response artifacts.
The expected post-rollout result is that supported 6.x dependencies resolve to 6.2.0 or later, 7.x dependencies resolve to 7.0.1 or later, older branches are absent, and the deployed image digest matches the inspected build. A retained inventory result provides the observable control state for each production runner.