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What a defender needs to know
A low-privileged user can alter execlist.txt on an affected INFINITT PACS System Manager workstation so that SmartExecute.exe runs added commands during an approved update, potentially with administrative privileges after the UAC prompt. A separate crafted imodular:// link can make IModular.exe dispatch unsafe functions as the user who opens it, including accessing files or programs on a network share and connecting to an attacker-controlled SignalR endpoint. CERT/CC reports no indications of exploitation.
Inventory System Manager builds on PACS workstations. CERT/CC names 3.0.11.3 and 3.0.11.5; the CVE records describe an affected range between those builds. Inspect execlist.txt writes before updates and correlate them with SmartUpdate.exe and SmartExecute.exe execution. Separately, examine IModular.exe launches, subsequent network-share reads and SignalR connections to unapproved destinations. A normal update sequence or handler launch needs its writer, parent process and destination for context.
Arrange the appropriate fixed build, 3.0.12.3 or 3.0.12.5, with the clinical application owner. Confirm the installed version on each updated workstation, and ask INFINITT support to map intermediate or custom builds to the correct branch. Pending maintenance, restrict manifest writes to the update identity and constrain PACS workstation egress to approved endpoints after checking clinical workflows. Preserve relevant process and network history for any suspicious activity before the update.
