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What a defender needs to know
CERT/CC’s November 12 ImageTragick2 note describes two file-access paths in applications that process untrusted images with ImageMagick. A crafted SVG can invoke the MSL scripting coder; content detection can hand a file named like an image to Ghostscript as PostScript. In the observed Ghostscript configuration, -dSAFER still permits file access in /tmp. The converter’s filesystem permissions decide which files are at risk. CERT/CC lists the Kiteworks platform and ownCloud Classic as affected; Kiteworks says fixes are in development and reports no indication of exploitation.
Identify the workers handling uploads, remote images, and AI image preprocessing or post-processing. Check their effective policy.xml, available coders and delegates, writable mounts, and shared /tmp; review policy violations, unexpected delegate activity, processing failures, and file creation against upload and job history. Apply product fixes and an allowlist for required formats. Disable unneeded MSL, MVG, PS, EPS, PDF, and the relevant Ghostscript delegate. Isolate image conversion from secrets and writable host paths.
Rails fixed affected Active Storage branches in 8.0.5.2 and 8.1.4.1; the shipped policy depends on the integration retaining MiniMagick.cli_env. Test a benign sample of a prohibited format in the actual worker: it should be rejected with a policy violation while required formats still process. An ImageMagick package update alone can leave the dangerous policy permissions intact.
