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Huntress Traces Token Replay Across 97 Microsoft 365 Accounts

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What a defender needs to know

Huntress traced a Microsoft 365 token-replay campaign from July 14 to September 22, 2026, involving 97 compromised accounts at 79 organizations. Attackers used a stolen session token to enter accounts after MFA, registered rogue devices and authenticator apps, and created inbox rules to hide replies. In one case, a hijacked mailbox sent a payroll-related email to an outside accountant while the account owner was kept from seeing the replies.

Huntress has expanded its Defender integration to route incidents from Defender for Identity, Defender for Office 365, Defender for Cloud Apps, and Entra ID Protection to its analysts. Incidents are attached to affected identities even without a device. In a recent two-week Huntress sample, 85% of medium- and high-severity incidents had no device evidence, so start an investigation with the users named in the incident rather than requiring a hostname.

For suspected replay, inspect Entra sign-ins, registered devices, MFA methods, and mailbox rules. Revoke the user’s sessions and reset the password, then remove unauthorized registrations and rules through your response process. Microsoft notes that existing access tokens can last until expiry and applications can control their own session cookies; terminate application-side sessions where applicable. Verify approved methods and devices remain and inbox replies reach the owner. Check every identity named in the Defender incident and extend containment where the evidence warrants it.

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