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What a defender needs to know
A joint CISA, FBI, DC3, NSA, USSS, and Korean National Police Agency advisory traces Gunra ransomware from internet-facing edge access to credential theft, cloud exfiltration, backup deletion, and Windows or Linux encryption. One victim lost up to tens of terabytes; another had backup data deleted at both primary and disaster recovery sites.
The FBI observed exploitation of CVE-2024-55591 and CVE-2025-24472. Upgrade affected systems to FortiOS 7.0.17 or later, FortiProxy 7.2.13 or later, or FortiProxy 7.0.20 or later. Review jsconsole logins, random administrators, forticloud-sync, altered VPN and VDI authentication, stolen sessions, secretsdump.py, psexec.py, smbclient.py, and OpenSSH tunnels.
Gunra used main.exe, 7-Zip, RClone, FileZilla, and Mega around OneDrive, SharePoint, and internal data theft. Windows impact markers include .ENCRT, .CRYPT, R3ADM3.txt, and this shadow-copy deletion pattern:
WMIC.exe shadowcopy where "ID='{guid of shadowcopy}'" delete
Verify the edge-to-recovery chain
Verify fixed edge releases, approved privileged identities, explained cloud transfers, and a clean restore from segmented immutable backup. On Fortinet devices, confirm the installed branch reports FortiOS 7.0.17 or later, FortiProxy 7.2.13 or later, or FortiProxy 7.0.20 or later. Investigate every jsconsole login, unexpected administrator, VPN change, stolen session, VDI authentication change, OpenSSH tunnel, and unexplained RDP or SMB movement.
Match OneDrive, SharePoint, archive, FileZilla, RClone, and Mega activity to approved work. Preserve .GNRA files, timestamps, notes, and logs in Linux incidents because the advisory says predictable key generation may permit recovery. The expected result is a fixed edge, no unexplained access chain or cloud transfer, intact segmented backups, and a successful clean restore test.