Google and its partners disrupted the XCPE botnet’s control infrastructure last week. More than 1.3 million set-top boxes were enrolled. The problem for anyone running one of these boxes on a home, office or guest network is that the backdoor arrived in firmware: removing its visible app can leave the system-level installer in place.

In its November 2 technical report, Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) assesses with high confidence that device manufacturer Videostrong Technology developed, deployed and operated the backdoor for profit. Google says Videostrong sold affiliates access to the devices; their modules ran ad fraud, routed traffic through residential proxy exits and installed more malware. GTIG observed operators capturing live screens, taking account information and running commands, including reverse shells. Google’s attribution is an assessment; check each box’s firmware and packages before labeling it compromised.

The installer survives app removal

The core package, x.cpe or com.oemservice in some builds, runs with android.uid.system privilege. Google found a stub preloaded in the system firmware. At boot it installs the corresponding package from /oem/ into /data/app/. If a user removes the installed app, that boot path can put it back. A factory reset that leaves the same firmware partition intact should therefore be treated as an unverified recovery step until the supplier can provide a trusted firmware replacement.

Google says the maker hid malicious code from its certification checks by loading it after first boot. It has since banned Videostrong and its future subsidiaries or affiliates from making certified Android devices or supplying software to other certified vendors, and says it is improving firmware-integrity review. That response changes future distribution; owners still have to address devices already in service.

Two channels task the box

The backdoor is a dispatcher as well as a foothold. It gets bootstrap configuration by HTTP, then keeps an MQTT connection for tasking. Google identifies registration under *[.]anyevonline[.]com; the MQTT broker mqtt[.]szbboys[.]com resolved in its analysis to 219[.]134[.]163[.]210 and 219[.]134[.]163[.]211, using ports 3885–3887. MQTT messages can direct silent installs, shell execution, screen capture and network reconnaissance. Use these as dated investigation leads after the takedown, correlated with package and firmware findings.

Google describes an earlier loader, com.abc.nexus, that took execution work from x.cpe and launched affiliates’ modules. Since August 2026, it has also seen tailored packages such as com.android.system.ntp and com.android.sso.auth.handler take the place of the general loader on parts of the botnet. Some variants use a native library called libexploit.so to place themselves under /system/priv-app/ with a permission XML under /system/etc/permissions/. A hunt that looks only for com.abc.nexus misses that newer path. The backdoor also sets the global setting package_verifier_user_consent to -1 to disable Google Play Protect app verification. Check that setting on suspect devices alongside the package and firmware evidence.

Affiliate traffic complicates network hunts

The box can be both a target and a traffic exit for someone else. GTIG found proxy modules, ad-fraud modules and additional backdoors on affected devices. A device serving as a residential proxy can send network traffic that appears to originate from the subscriber’s address. Google also observed infected Android-based telehealth equipment, karaoke machines and digital signage, although set-top boxes dominated its observed fleet.

GTIG says it took legal action against Videostrong’s control and module-delivery infrastructure and against domains used by more than a dozen affiliate malware families. It assesses that disrupting affiliate control domains will cut access to at least 10 million additional compromised devices reached through distribution channels beyond XCPE. That wider number is Google’s projected disruption of affiliate access, separate from the more than 1.3 million devices enrolled in XCPE. Google calls this a disruption that will require continued work against the supply chain. Its own account puts the firmware persistence risk on the device owner’s side of the takedown.

Google describes some module downloads from operator-owned GitHub (github.com) release pages. GitHub is a shared hosting service; an ordinary connection to GitHub says little on its own. Correlate unusual download history with the packages, firmware and network tasking on the same device. GTIG also lists the host ott[.]szbboys[.]com in its XCPE infrastructure. Avoid treating every hit on a legacy C2 address as live control after the reported disruption; preserve dates and device context.

Take suspect boxes off network

Inventory Android TV set-top boxes and any Android-based kiosks or telehealth devices sourced through the implicated supply chain. On devices you manage, examine installed and firmware-resident packages for x.cpe or com.oemservice; look for the /oem/ copy and an installation under /data/app/. Check for com.abc.nexus and the newer system-looking packages named above, then correlate device DNS and flow logs with *[.]anyevonline[.]com, mqtt[.]szbboys[.]com, and MQTT ports 3885–3887. Google reports multiple brands and builds, so confirm suspected infection with device-level firmware and package findings alongside dated network evidence.

Disconnect a confirmed compromised device from the network while arranging replacement or a supplier-verified clean firmware image. Isolation stops its remote-control session and proxy traffic while you investigate. Ask the supplier for the actual firmware provenance and a way to verify the /oem/ and system partitions after recovery. Keep the box isolated until its supplier verifies clean firmware and the system and /oem/ partitions; app removal or a reset alone can leave the installer in place. Google wrote, “A device manufacturer intentionally infecting their users with malware is an unacceptable breach of trust, and represents a serious risk to those users.” A network takedown buys time; trusted device firmware decides whether this box can safely come back.