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WFX stealer erases GitHub Actions runs after stealing CI secrets

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What a defender needs to know

StepSecurity reports that attackers with stolen GitHub write tokens pushed the WFX secret stealer into GitHub Actions workflows and scripts already run by CI, then reverted commits and deleted runs. A surviving nextcloud/docker run executed the stealer. At 07:40 UTC November 12, GitHub search returned more than 63,000 probe pull requests; check subsequent commits and runs to identify stealer execution.

Search since November 10 for pull requests titled docs: dependency audit notes from wfx-docs, then examine commits titled ci: refresh build cache, chore: add ci helper, chore: add dependency audit workflow, ci: restore and ci: cleanup. Compare those commits to Actions run numbers and deletion audit records. Inspect prior versions of workflows, package.json hooks and the shell scripts CI invokes, even if the current file looks clean.

For an injected job that ran, revoke the writing token, rotate credentials available to the runner and check cloud federation. StepSecurity describes AWS role trust changed to wildcard Principal/AWS values, new IAM access keys and Azure federated credentials named wfx-ci-*; inspect GCP GenerateAccessToken and SignJwt events too. The published collection IPs 194[.]150[.]166[.]244, 18[.]143[.]168[.]96 and 153[.]75[.]82[.]159 miss later samples that delivered via the legitimate api.telegram.org service. Verify recovery against Git commit history, Actions run sequence and cloud trust changes rather than the current workflow alone.

Primary sources