A phone-system message can turn into a server command on affected FreeSWITCH installations. SignalWire’s advisory says attackers have exploited this path in the wild. The issue affects SIP profiles that accept inbound MESSAGE, including the stock internal and external profiles, and the fix is FreeSWITCH 1.11.3.
CISA added CVE-2026-116779 to its known-exploited catalog on November 9. A compromised call server can expose its configuration and credentials, let an attacker control calls and run operating-system commands with the FreeSWITCH process’s privileges. CISA sets November 12 as the federal remediation due date and calls for forensic triage. Operators outside that mandate can use the date as an urgency signal while following their own incident and change process.
A message selects a command interface
FreeSWITCH normally routes incoming SIP messages to chat handlers. In the affected code, sofia_presence_handle_sip_i_message() splits the recipient’s user field at a plus sign and uses the left side to choose a registered chat protocol. SignalWire says the api chat interface registered by mod_dptools then hands its address to switch_api_execute(). A peer whose message reaches that profile can make the daemon execute a FreeSWITCH API command; available command paths include OS command execution and, when mod_lua is loaded, inline Lua.
The routing choice comes from the SIP recipient, rather than a privileged FreeSWITCH console. SignalWire says the selector does not distinguish chat-delivery protocols from command-execution protocols. A sender who can get a message accepted can cross that boundary using a field intended to route chat. Check which profiles receive SIP messages and which peers can submit them.
SignalWire says, “Exploitation of this path has been observed in the wild.” The CVE Program record identifies versions before 1.11.3 as affected and records the same command-routing behavior. SignalWire credits Örn Arnarson and Gunnlaugur for the finding.
Default chat reaches exposed profiles
SignalWire says inbound chat is enabled by default on the stock internal and external SIP profiles. A profile that accepts a single MESSAGE meets the entry condition. Where message authentication is enforced, one ordinary profile account, such as an extension or trunk peer, is enough. The stock conf/vanilla/directory/default/default.xml user lacks password material; installations retaining that user can admit messages without an attacker-controlled account unless allow-empty-password is false for it. Inspect the Skinny example directory user as well.
SignalWire says MESSAGE authentication is enabled by default starting with 1.10.7. On a newer but unfixed build, that default still admits a registered account on the profile. The stock vanilla directory contains two users without password or a1-hash material: default and a Skinny example. Check the deployed directory for both, remove entries lacking either form of credential material, and verify allow-empty-password for any user retained without it. That narrows unauthenticated access; an extension or trunk peer with a valid account can still reach the vulnerable API route.
SignalWire says inbound ACLs do not cover MESSAGE. Likewise, auth-messages alone still leaves authenticated accounts able to reach the command interface, and disable_system_api_commands=true removes one OS-command route while leaving other FreeSWITCH APIs available, including module loading and call origination. These controls can reduce exposure while operators arrange the fix; they do not replace it.
For an older build using disable_system_api_commands=true, investigate more than OS-command activity. SignalWire says other registered APIs remain available, including module loading and call origination. Include module activity and call records in triage alongside SIP message traces. An ACL check for inbound calls can miss this route because the vendor says the inbound ACL does not cover MESSAGE; inventory the message access of each profile separately.
Upgrade and inspect message handling
Find FreeSWITCH servers and check the installed build against 1.11.3. On every SIP profile, determine whether inbound MESSAGE is accepted and which peers can send it. Prioritize externally reachable profiles and those that accept messages from extensions, handsets or trunks. Upgrade affected installations to 1.11.3 or a vendor-supported fixed build. For profiles that have no need for inbound SIP chat, set enable-chat=false; this disables all inbound message chat on that profile, so confirm the service impact with the telephony owner.
The fix adds the per-profile enable-chat-api-proto setting, off by default. On a fixed build, a message attempting to select the api chat interface when that setting is off gets a 403, and FreeSWITCH logs its source and requested command. Check that the fixed build and intended profile settings are deployed, then review those rejection logs for attempts against the affected interface. On an older build, inspect available SIP message traces and FreeSWITCH logs for unusual inbound messages and API activity. Because the fix introduces the explicit 403 rejection log, earlier logs can miss attempts; preserve process evidence when investigating a reachable server. If you find signs of misuse, preserve telephony logs and process evidence and investigate credentials and call activity alongside the server.
SignalWire says the fixed release compares the api selector case-insensitively, matching the chat registry. The new enable-chat-api-proto parameter ships commented out in the vanilla profiles and the mod_sofia sample; inspect effective settings for an explicit opt-in instead of treating a commented example as enabled. With API chat disabled, messages with no selector or another chat protocol still route normally. If a telephony workflow needs inbound chat, test that workflow after upgrading while checking the 403 rejections for attempted API selections.
Keep API chat closed
Upgrade affected FreeSWITCH servers to 1.11.3 and verify the installed build. Set enable-chat=false on profiles that do not need inbound SIP chat. Where chat is required, keep enable-chat-api-proto off and review the fixed release’s 403 rejection logs: each rejected attempt records its source and requested command. With that setting off, ordinary chat messages still reach their registered handlers. Preserve SIP traces when investigating older builds because those explicit rejection logs start with the fix.