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Attackers Hid PEERSTITCH in Fortinet Firewalls After Manager Breach

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What a defender needs to know

Unit 42 investigated a telecom provider intrusion that began with CVE-2024-47575 on FortiManager. The attackers stole an archive with running configurations and cryptographic material for more than 500 managed FortiGates, including devices protecting clients. They used recovered credentials for unauthorized VPN access, pushed packet-capture settings and installed PEERSTITCH on selected firewalls using the authenticated FortiOS CLI traversal CVE-2025-61624. The implant patched memory in miglogd and iked so session tags could pass between the logging and VPN processes. Unit 42 investigated the provider’s network; client owners should scope the material exposed for their firewalls with the provider.

Check FortiManager for rogue device serial FMG-VMTM23017412, archive .tm, and registrations from 45.32.41[.]202 or 198.199.122[.]22. Correlate VPN logins from 23.240.77[.]233 and 47.18.167[.]159. On firewalls, search configuration revisions for system.auto-script traversal names including ../../../../setup; inspect diagnose debug crashlog read for Signal 11 involving miglogd or iked. If response access permits, preserve memory and check /proc/<pid>/maps for anonymous 16,384-byte rwxp mappings. PEERSTITCH leaves no persistent binary after injection.

Update FortiManager to the fixed release for its branch and FortiOS 7.6 to 7.6.5 or 7.4 to 7.4.10; migrate FortiOS 7.2, 7.0 and 6.4 to fixed branches per Fortinet. Restrict FGFM 541/TCP to approved management hosts. After suspected archive theft, replace exposed VPN and administrative passwords, certificates and private keys, then verify authorized device registrations, configuration pulls and VPN sessions with the new trust material.

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