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What a defender needs to know
Zscaler found an initial access broker tied to Payouts King ransomware using Teams messages and a fake Outlook update page to install Edgecution. The malware paired a headless Microsoft Edge extension with a Python backdoor. Setup scripts registered a native messaging host and scheduled Edge to run with a separate profile and an unpacked extension, keeping the command channel outside the victim’s normal browser window.
The extension received commands over WebSockets. For host-level work, it called chrome.runtime.sendNativeMessage; Edge consulted the attacker’s local manifest and started a batch file that launched Python. The backdoor could collect system information, execute shell and PowerShell commands, write files, run Python code and enumerate processes. Zscaler described abuse of a supported browser integration, rather than exploitation of a browser vulnerability.
Hunt scheduled tasks and command lines that launch Edge with --headless, --load-extension or an unusual --user-data-dir. Collect native messaging registrations, manifest paths, allowed extension IDs and the process tree beneath Edge. User-writable hosts and batch wrappers warrant investigation.
Microsoft Edge allows user-level native messaging hosts when the controlling policy is enabled or unset. Disable that route where it is unnecessary, or deny hosts by default and allow only documented integrations. Treat confirmed Edgecution execution as a host compromise, preserving the extension, Python, registry and scheduled-task evidence before cleanup.
Verify that retained native hosts match approved extensions and executables. Remove persistence, investigate follow-on commands, and replace exposed credentials.