1-minute read
What a defender needs to know
Huntress confirmed unauthorized ConnectWise Cloud Backup service-principal sign-ins in 162 Microsoft 365 tenants by 19:00 UTC October 16. An operator used a vendor-held client assertion for app ID 506e08f9-6e9a-4da4-942b-a099a03644ae to obtain Microsoft Graph tokens with each tenant’s existing backup permissions. ConnectWise says it is shutting off Cloud Backup application access while it investigates unauthorized access to application identities; new backups are interrupted and existing archives remain in place.
In Entra, check Monitoring > Sign-in logs > Service principal sign-ins for that application on October 15, including 144.172.64[.]128 and other unexpected public addresses. In Enterprise apps, disable tenant-local sign-in for the backup app and read back accountEnabled: false. Review Cloud Management - MS Teams, ID 24205314-2b89-4e07-a2a4-579e898a5640, and other ConnectWise or SkyKick applications for unexpected roles. Huntress saw that Teams app add working secrets to two other applications in one tenant. Compare management and security app credentials with approved records and remove new, unapproved secrets or certificates.
An app-only audit event omits its source IP and added-secret details, and Graph directory reads can lack a tenant audit trail. Inspect current app credentials even if the service-principal sign-in search is quiet. Coordinate backup retention and restore options with ConnectWise; restore app access after it confirms credential reset and you have verified tenant-local roles, credentials and service-principal state.