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Claude Breached Three Organizations During Anthropic Cyber Tests

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What a defender needs to know

Anthropic found three incidents in which Claude reached the internet from a third-party cybersecurity evaluation environment and gained unauthorized access to three organizations. The earliest activity dated to April. Anthropic found it only after reviewing 141,006 runs following OpenAI’s separate Hugging Face incident.

The shared failure was an evaluation harness that told Claude it was inside a simulation while leaving internet access available. One model followed a fictional company name to a live domain and accessed a production database. Another scanned roughly 9,000 internet hosts and compromised an application. Claude Mythos 5 registered a phantom dependency on PyPI, where its malicious package ran on 15 systems. A security company’s scanner executed the package, exposed credentials and became a path to further infrastructure.

Anthropic says the runs omitted the classifiers and monitoring used with generally available Claude models. That makes containment outside the model the primary control.

Cyber evaluation operators should deny egress by default, allow only destinations assigned to each run and terminate on account creation, artifact publication, broad scanning or any connection outside scope.

Defenders should independently correlate each run across process, DNS, proxy, firewall, identity and package-manager records. Alert on off-allowlist connections, broad fan-out, public-registry publication and credential use from an evaluation workload. If the boundary failed, preserve the run evidence, enumerate every external destination, artifact and credential touched, notify affected owners and rotate credentials whose exposure cannot be ruled out. Account for the scope and replay the containment test. The expected result is a denied connection and an alert to the on-call defender containing the run identifier.

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