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What a defender needs to know
Unit 42 tracked CL-UNK-1211 on government Linux infrastructure between October 2025 and April 2026. Attackers put PHP web shells on servers, then changed auto_prepend_file in configurations under /etc/php/ and /opt/plesk/php/. PHP loads the named file ahead of the requested page. In one case the attacker-controlled file was /usr/lib/php/plesk_sys_driver.php. The attackers also dumped database contents.
The intruders also used a malicious sudo alias in .bashrc to capture passwords in Solarwinds.StatusLog.txt, searched qmail mailboxes for social-media messages and deployed the Go backdoor SysGoRAT. One attempted mailbox-archive script, zip_mails.sh, contained a syntax error. The SolarWinds filename was camouflage; Unit 42 found no SolarWinds compromise in this operation. Its observed Cortex XDR process-termination attempts were stopped. Conversational comments in scripts support Unit 42’s AI-assisted-code assessment, while the operator’s affiliation remains unknown.
Compare effective auto_prepend_file values and PHP configuration files with the trusted baseline, then restore unauthorized entries and remove malicious files through incident response. Inspect .bashrc and rotate credentials exposed by a malicious alias. Review /var/qmail/mailnames/ access and look for search_social.php, zip_mails.sh and sys-update.service. Correlate process activity with traffic to 104[.]194[.]158[.]65:443, while checking the binary and service even if that address is absent because the backdoor’s destination is configurable. Verify an ordinary PHP request loads only your approved prepend file, or none where that is your baseline; inspect mail and account access before returning affected hosts to service.