A local account on a Check Point Gaia system can send commands to a root-running DynamicCLI daemon through a socket any local user can write. CISA listed CVE-2026-123039 as known exploited on November 13 and set a November 16 action date. Teams running Check Point gateways or management systems have a short window to identify affected installations and apply vendor guidance.
The attacker needs authenticated local access to Gaia, through a user account or a process running under one. That local foothold can become root access on a security system. CISA lists Firewall, Multi-Domain Security Management Server, Scalable Platforms, Security Gateway and Security Management Server in its entry.
DynamicCLI trusts the local socket
Check Point calls the issue “Local privilege escalation to root in the DynamicCLI process via local world-writable control socket.” Its CVE record identifies the socket as /tmp/dynamic_socket. The Gaia DynamicCLI daemon runs as root, and the socket accepts commands without authenticating the connecting process. A user who has already gained local access can cross that permission boundary and run commands with the daemon’s root privileges.
Check Point’s CVE record names Quantum Security Gateway and Quantum Security Management as affected product lines. For each, it lists R82.10 with Jumbo Hotfix Take 50 or below, R82.20 with Take 10 or below, R82 with Take 130 or below, and R81.20 with Take 173 or below. Match each system’s release branch with its installed take. CISA’s product list is broader, so inventory those named system roles too and confirm their applicable treatment with Check Point.
Scope local accounts and hotfix takes
Start with the Check Point inventory: identify Gaia gateways and management systems, record each release branch and installed Jumbo Hotfix Take, and compare the two Quantum product lines with the affected ranges above. On systems in those ranges, review which named local accounts and automation processes have shell access, then remove unneeded access while the vendor remediation is scheduled. Include management hosts as well as gateways in that access review; a foothold on either puts the root-running daemon within a local user’s reach.
The socket path is a useful triage artifact. From an authorized Gaia shell, ls -ld /tmp/dynamic_socket records the socket’s mode and owner without sending data to the daemon. Retain that result alongside the installed take and local-account review. A world-writable mode helps identify the described exposure. For a post-fix check, verify the installed vendor mitigation and branch-specific take; a socket-mode reading records permissions, while the flaw also lacks connecting-process authentication. Use your deployment’s authentication and process logs to investigate the accounts and activity tied to a suspected foothold.
Apply Check Point’s supported mitigation
CISA directs operators to apply vendor mitigations and perform forensic triage under its guidance, with November 16 as the listed due date. Ask Check Point for the applicable mitigation and, if available, the first-fixed take for each product and branch before scheduling changes. Record the installed take and the vendor-recommended mitigation for each affected system, apply that treatment, then verify its installed state and the set of local accounts that still have access. If a system has suspicious local activity, preserve its logs and investigate the account and root-level changes before returning it to normal operations.
Because the vulnerable socket is local to Gaia, narrow who can run on the host, record its branch and take, and complete the vendor-supported change.