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What a defender needs to know
Unit 42 published a controlled public GitHub exposure test in which AWS attached AWSCompromisedKeyQuarantineV3 to the affected IAM user 10 seconds after an access key and secret were pushed. CloudTrail recorded AttachUserPolicy, but userIdentity named that user even though AWS performed the attachment. A responder who trusts that identity field as the actor may miss an automatic credential-exposure alert. The test measures one response interval, not a service-wide guarantee.
Search CloudTrail IAM management events for AttachUserPolicy and a quarantine policy name in requestParameters.policyArn, including arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AWSCompromisedKeyQuarantineV3. Link the affected user to the AWS Health notice and Support case; their creation did not appear in CloudTrail during this test. GitHub’s GetCallerIdentity validation user agent can supply another lead, but classify that traffic as GitHub secret checking, not attacker activity. Very large GitHub pushes and pushes with more than five secrets may leave scanning gaps.
The policy denies selected operations rather than switching the key off. From an administrator identity, deactivate and replace the exposed access key, review its earlier CloudTrail use, and follow the AWS Support case without removing the quarantine policy. Verify that the old key is inactive or deleted and the workload uses its replacement. Prefer temporary role credentials for work that can move away from long-term keys.