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Attackers Briefly Hijacked AOMEI Updates to Plant Backdoors

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What a defender needs to know

UNC7017 briefly changed AOMEI Backupper and AnyViewer update and notification instructions between April and July 2026. Google Threat Intelligence Group and Mandiant confirmed server tampering windows of ten minutes on May 28, six minutes on July 16 and five minutes on July 20. A client polling during a window could download a malicious upgrade-now.zip and run its upgrade-now.exe loader. The July 20 notification file also introduced an invisible WebDAV request to 8[.]210[.]84[.]56 that could transmit NetNTLMv2 authentication material. AOMEI told the researchers it took corrective action on its distribution servers.

On Windows hosts that ran these AOMEI products during April through July, preserve %PROGRAMFILES(X86)%\AOMEI\*\Tmphtml\ and correlate updater process trees and proxy records at the time of suspicious downloads. Search for the RadminComponentRuntime and NitroRuntime tasks, BlkScrDl.dll under %LOCALAPPDATA%\Radmin\, and Eztwain4.dll under %LOCALAPPDATA%\Nitro Pro\. The signed Radmin launcher can sit beside the malicious DLL. A clean current update URL may simply reflect the server’s restored configuration; use the endpoint artifacts and historical connections for the decision.

Block the actor destinations promotion[.]storage-data[.]com, aomei[.]storage-data[.]com, storage-data[.]com and 8[.]210[.]84[.]56, and restrict external SMB and WebDAV authentication to approved destinations. On confirmed affected hosts, remove unauthorized tasks and malware through incident response. Verify the tasks stay absent and outbound actor contacts stop after remediation.

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