1-minute read of a 5 min report

Alpine OpenSSH flaw lets key-only accounts accept password logins

By

1-minute read

What a defender needs to know

On Alpine Linux, a key-only SSH account can accept a password under a narrow set of conditions. The CVE-2026-123158 OpenSSH bypass affects Linux systems using musl libc without PAM, with vulnerable sshd, PasswordAuthentication yes, an SSH-eligible account whose shadow field is *, and another local account with a real SHA-crypt hash. A failed musl crypt() calculation returns *; the vulnerable non-PAM path compares that error value to the target account’s * and accepts it. Direct root login also requires PermitRootLogin yes.

StepSecurity reproduced the issue in an Alpine VM and container running pre-fix 10.3_p1-r1. Its lab logs showed Failed password followed by Accepted password for a key-only account in the same session. StepSecurity found no confirmed exploitation in the original disclosure or vendor advisories it reviewed on November 6. Investigate accepted password events for accounts with a * shadow field, preserving source address, username and nearby SSH logs.

On Alpine 3.24, upgrade to at least 10.3_p1-r2; consult Alpine’s security tracker for your branch and check the installed revision with apk info -v openssh-server. Rebuild older images and restart sshd after upgrading. Where keys suffice, set PasswordAuthentication no and verify the effective policy for the affected account. A server banner can retain an older upstream version after Alpine backports the fix; use the package revision and running service for verification.

Primary sources