Attackers Push Rogue ScreenConnect Clients to Hundreds of Managed Endpoints
Huntress traces two waves of rogue remote-client installs to ScreenConnect panel commands linked to an RMM+ blank-key flaw. Inspect panel history and connected hosts.

Attackers used ScreenConnect panels to install their own remote-support clients on at least 288 managed hosts across 48 organizations on November 11, according to Huntress. A second wave on November 13 hit 205 hosts across 41 organizations. These are separate wave counts; an MSP investigating its own fleet should identify affected endpoints from panel history rather than add the two figures as a unique-host total.
Huntress linked commands sent through the panels to RMM+, a third-party ScreenConnect extension whose blank access key could let requests through in versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32. ConnectWise had not identified the initial access route in its November 11 advisory; the RMM+ command logs tell operators where to start investigating panel activity. The commands installed rogue clients and SCKit on managed Windows machines, where ScreenConnect normally has broad support authority. Huntress saw all 288 first-wave hosts affected in 90 minutes, about a third in the first 10.
An empty key opens RMM+
RMM+ lets another management tool operate ScreenConnect sessions without a technician signing in through the console. It uses a shared RMMPlus.AccessKey setting rather than ScreenConnect user roles and MFA. In the affected extension versions, the default key was empty; if an administrator had never set it, the authentication check accepted a blank value. Huntress says most RMM+ installations it examined were legitimate, often left in place after a project. It found RMM+-linked commands in affected logs without corresponding console logins. Check for that pairing in your own panel’s Run Command history before treating a missing technician login as a clean bill of health.
ConnectWise told Huntress it disabled five third-party extensions across more than 400 hosted partner environments as a precaution: Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link and RMM+ Password Link. For self-hosted panels it urged partners to disable the specified extensions. Huntress also observed a self-hosted RMM+ instance in the November 13 activity. Check extension name, version and key state on every panel you operate, including self-hosted instances outside ConnectWise’s hosted action.
Panel commands seed rogue clients
The operator used the panel’s Run Command feature to send installation commands to multiple endpoints as SYSTEM. On one host, that meant an unauthorized ScreenConnect installer at C:\Windows\TEMP\sc.msi followed by SCKit components under C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap\. Huntress describes a 16-file kit. Its TrapWatch scheduled task repeatedly stops the legitimate client and places the attacker’s relay in its connection slot, so a machine may still appear reachable through the expected panel. A RelayTrapLiteAlert value under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run and the rogue-client service provide separate persistence clues.
The later wave used an installer hosted at 185[.]241[.]211[.]197, with a relay at 007[.]from-ak[.]com on port 88. Huntress saw one panel associated with 190 downstream clients and another with eight; the rising Exploited suffix in installer names suggested campaign tracking to its researchers. Use the suffix to correlate installer events with panel commands; identify affected hosts from panel history.
SCKit waits for technicians
The recovered kit also contains a route from an infected endpoint to a connecting technician workstation: a file-transfer action meant to run a dropper on that workstation, capture its ScreenConnect session cookie, and use panel access to reach other endpoints through the Shared Toolbox. That path is a serious reason to use out-of-band administration during response. Huntress states, “The console-takeover attempt failed in every recovered host log we have checked so far.” The observed installs came from panel-issued commands; the recovered code explains why a technician connecting to a suspect host still needs a clean-machine response.
The separate client flaw, CVE-2026-84869, affects ScreenConnect clients before 26.6.5 and permits unauthorized file transfer and execution through an active session in certain circumstances. ConnectWise’s CVE record says ScreenConnect servers are unaffected by that client flaw. Huntress found this November RMM+ path affecting even current ScreenConnect versions 26.6.6.9747 and 26.7.6.9783. Update technician clients to at least 26.6.5 to address the client issue, and investigate the extension and panel commands separately.
Trace the panel and endpoints
Start at the panels. Reconcile Run Command and Toolbox history with approved work, looking for RMM+-linked requests with no matching technician console login. Preserve instance logs and identify the connected endpoints behind each unusual command. On those endpoints, compare installed ScreenConnect services and client IDs against your authorized inventory. Huntress identifies rogue IDs 2588ef5c15954b10 and ed630cc2c873b091, participant Addmin, UpdateConnect.ClientService.exe under C:\ProgramData\Windows Update Agent (de362a425905bcc4)\, and the service display name Windows Update Agent in a later incident. The account for that service was LocalSystem.
Look as well for TrapWatch, C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap\, RelayTrapLiteAlert, sckit-decoder.ps1, Panel-Lateral.ps1, LabConfig.ps1, TrapWatch.ps1, RelayTrap.cs, ToolboxRelayUploader.exe, runnew.cmd and sqlite3.exe. Huntress lists attacker infrastructure 185[.]241[.]211[.]197, 007[.]from-ak[.]com, 185[.]99[.]255[.]28, newnewnew[.]gotdns[.]org, sc[.]payproofkit[.]com, 155[.]94[.]150[.]39, soxnewwork[.]homedns[.]org, cdn007-digitaldownloads[.]com and ns[.]mo7sen[.]dev. Keep these as investigation leads with timestamps and panel context: Huntress says scripts carry variable embedded values and host-specific executables, making file hashes weak sole matches.
Recover from a clean machine
Disable the named extensions on self-hosted panels, then establish which endpoints received unauthorized commands and isolate affected hosts. Use WinRM or another out-of-band CLI from a clean device instead of opening a ScreenConnect session to a suspect host; the recovered toolkit was built to target a connecting technician. If a technician already joined, investigate that workstation from another clean device. Remove the rogue client and TrapWatch persistence while preserving the legitimate client; revoke exposed ScreenConnect sessions and credentials and potentially exposed browser and identity-provider sessions.
Verify the extension state and installed technician-client build on each affected panel. Before reconnecting an isolated endpoint, confirm its rogue service, scheduled task and RelayTrap directory are gone, its legitimate client matches your inventory, and new panel commands match approved support work. Huntress observed reinfection shortly after isolation ended on affected systems, so watch the panel and host together during return to service.