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Fake installers put Windows PCs to work for proxy and compute operators

Microsoft traced deceptive software downloads through Inno installer stages to proxy, compute and unwanted utility installs. Trace the full session and its scheduled tasks.

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An installer window sits above an unexpected second software package on a plain desktop.

A fake download for a game, audio plugin or cracked utility can leave a Windows PC running somebody else’s proxy or compute workload. In its November 3 investigation, Microsoft Security Research traced deceptive installers that delivered several independent software “offers” in one session. One branch installed WorldProxyPool and set recurring SYSTEM tasks; another installed CharityEngine and BOINC. Microsoft also confirmed an unwanted Windows Manager utility branch.

For teams managing Windows endpoints, the consequence can persist after the installer window closes: a proxy agent routes third-party traffic through the machine, or distributed-compute software spends its resources. Microsoft says the software itself may have legitimate uses; the problem is installation through deceptive bundles “often without users’ informed knowledge or consent.” Start with the installation chain, then decide which of its offers actually ran on each device.

A download opens several paths

The user runs a file presented as a cracked product, game, activator, plugin or utility. Microsoft’s observed Inno Setup-style wrappers spawn temporary runners under %TEMP%\is-*.tmp\, followed by numbered eld*.exe stages; some sessions also include set_*.exe. Those paths and names are better investigation anchors than the lure filename, which changes between downloads.

The temporary runner contacts rotating infrastructure. Its per-offer callbacks carry d=inno with r=offer_execution or r=offer_execution_fail, plus offer and session fields such as o, dn, sis and spot. Microsoft treats the fields’ business meanings as assessments based on telemetry correlations. The sis value stayed stable within an installer session in its observations, while offer identifiers and the spot placement changed as that session progressed. Group callbacks by device and time, then use those fields where available to find the related offer attempts; follow their process events to see which installer ran. A failed callback belongs to one offer: other offers in that installer session can still succeed. Some child payloads started before or around the callback, so a network-only hunt will miss part of the sequence.

Microsoft observed callback domains including beliefdesk[.]xyz, companyharbor[.]xyz, signalpane[.]cfd, inkact[.]xyz and wishgrove[.]cfd. These rotated; pair domain matches with the d=inno callback pattern, temporary process tree and subsequent installation before deciding what happened to a host.

Proxy tasks outlive the installer

The WorldProxyPool branch placed sdk-agent.exe and sdk-agent.updater.exe beneath C:\Program Files\WorldProxyPool\. In Microsoft’s investigated chain, WorldProxyPoolAgent ran at startup as SYSTEM and was also started immediately. WorldProxyPoolWatchdog ran a hidden watchdog script every five minutes; WorldProxyPoolUpdater ran hourly. The tasks ran with highest privileges. A normal-looking Windows Task Scheduler service process can then be the parent of recurring agent activity.

The compute branch installed CharityEngine, BOINC and supporting components, including VirtualBox, under C:\Program Files\BOINC\ and C:\ProgramData\BOINC\. A third branch installed AW Manager / Windows Manager components and an updater-style utility under user or program-files locations. Check the software inventory as well as the tasks: a single machine may have reached more than one of these branches, and the name of the downloaded lure tells you little about its final state.

Trace each device’s installation session

In Microsoft Defender XDR, hunt DeviceProcessEvents for execution beneath \AppData\Local\Temp\is- and filenames resembling eld*.exe or set_*.exe; correlate the device and time with DeviceNetworkEvents carrying d=inno and either offer-result marker. Use the source’s advanced-hunting queries as a starting point and validate them against your tenant’s current schema. Review child process launches, downloads, installed software and scheduled-task creation over the full session. A callback records an individual result, so follow other offers even after a failure marker.

On endpoints where that chain appears, inspect WorldProxyPoolAgent, WorldProxyPoolWatchdog and WorldProxyPoolUpdater for the recorded SYSTEM startup, five-minute and hourly schedules. Compare them with installed WorldProxyPool, CharityEngine, BOINC, VirtualBox and AW Manager software. An individual product’s presence calls for checking its installation history; this campaign’s combination of an untrusted Inno chain and silent additions makes it actionable.

Remove the extra workloads

Block untrusted software sources and configure potentially unwanted application protection for managed Windows endpoints. Microsoft also recommends cloud-delivered Defender Antivirus protection, tamper protection and reputation-based download protection; verify their actual endpoint policy state. For a host that ran a deceptive installer, investigate the related software and persistence, contain it according to your incident process, then remove unauthorized software and its tasks. Keep the process and network history long enough to identify every offer the session delivered.

Recheck that device’s software inventory and Task Scheduler after cleanup. The expected result is no unauthorized proxy, compute or utility installation, no WorldProxyPool agent, watchdog or updater tasks, and no recurring executions or related callbacks during the observation window. That check addresses the installed outcome, not just the original download.

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