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Sogou Input Method Hijack Delivered DarkVigil Through an Icon Update

SlippyNunchucks redirected an unencrypted Sogou configuration request, then used existing component loading to run a surveillance implant. Windows builds before 16.10 are affected.

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A bright green sprout appears in an empty input-method candidate bar, with a faint red reflection along one edge.

On July 1, three days after a clean QuickFox release, ESET saw DarkVigil launch again on victim machines. This time the launching process was SGTool.exe, part of Sogou Input Method for Windows. ESET researcher Anh Ho traces the infection to a brand-promotion icon configuration retrieved over plain HTTP. SlippyNunchucks redirected the request and supplied a replacement configuration that put malware where the input method would load it.

The victims ESET observed included organizations and Chinese-speaking individuals in Hong Kong, Thailand, Japan, Vietnam, Sri Lanka and Oman. The ESET-assigned CVE record identifies the affected product as Sogou Input Method for Windows before 16.10, assigns CVE-2026-120422, and describes arbitrary code execution after a network attacker replaces a configuration response. The attack needs influence over network traffic. ESET writes, “The point at which DNS manipulation occurs remains unknown.” Investigate the endpoint and its DNS path rather than assuming the local router was altered.

An icon request delivered instructions

Sogou’s branded cell dictionaries can display a small green sprout beside promoted vocabulary. SGTool.exe retrieves the icon configuration through the legitimate Sogou backend config.pinyin.sogou.com, at /api/brandScd/getBrandScd.php. ESET found that this request, among 20 endpoints on that host, used unencrypted HTTP in the analyzed client. The host itself also supported HTTPS with a valid Tencent certificate; the vulnerable client request bypassed that protection.

In the observed environments, DNS resolved the legitimate backend name to attacker staging IPs 47.239.250[.]102 or 47.237.122[.]175. The replacement server answered the HTTP request with an encrypted configuration in the expected format. The application held the AES key and IV in SGTool.exe, so encryption of the configuration did not authenticate who supplied it. The attacker changed the md5 integrity fields to match the substituted files as well.

The configuration pointed the client at the attacker-controlled sogou-cdn[.]com staging domain for two files: a signed Adobe Licensing WF Helper binary renamed biz_helper.exe, and the DarkVigil implant libcef.dll. The first file’s SHA-1 is 79188C8DE2378B437D39E867475C5B4714A0D7C9.

Sogou component loading ran DarkVigil

Sogou’s own component workflow supplied the next step. In one observed path, the configuration placed the renamed Adobe binary at \Components\SogouComMgr.exe; when SGTool.exe used its component manager, the signed binary loaded \Components\libcef.dll alongside it. Another path used the versioned \Components\biz_center\<version_number>\ component directory, where normal BizCenterCom loading had the same effect. ESET says the two execution paths are mutually exclusive at a given time and can disrupt the input method. The implant can retain a foothold through these existing load paths, even if an update replaces one component-manager file.

Once running, DarkVigil uses the Duplex Message Transport Protocol for command-and-control traffic and can receive plugins. ESET’s analysis of the 2025 toolset describes compressed plugin binaries stored under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\IME\<HWID>\pluginHash; its assessment of newer builds allows for changed method names or capabilities. ESET assesses SlippyNunchucks as a distinct China-aligned group and says its telemetry has no overlap with Mustang Panda activity, despite public attribution to Mustang Panda elsewhere.

Look at DNS and component files

Start with Windows endpoints running Sogou Input Method, especially machines whose users or network paths overlap ESET’s reported targeting. Search DNS and proxy records for SGTool.exe requests to the legitimate config.pinyin.sogou.com path /api/brandScd/getBrandScd.php over HTTP and resolutions to 47.239.250[.]102 or 47.237.122[.]175. The legitimate host name is a search pivot; those two IPs and sogou-cdn[.]com belong to the attacker staging route in ESET’s investigation. A historical resolution to a staging address warrants investigation of the endpoint’s subsequent file activity, not an assumption that a payload executed.

On a suspicious machine, inspect \SogouInput\Components\ and its biz_center versioned directories for biz_helper.exe, libcef.dll and unexpected replacement of SogouComMgr.exe. Correlate the file history with SGTool.exe process launches, component loading and the registry location HKCU\Software\Microsoft\IME\<HWID>\pluginHash. Investigate any suspicious component or plugin as possible compromise before returning the system to service. A patch to the network request cannot remove an implant that already ran.

Update Sogou and verify HTTPS

ESET says Tencent addressed the insecure request in Sogou Input Method 16.10, released in late October, by moving the affected traffic to HTTPS and enabling certificate pinning. Upgrade affected Windows installations to 16.10 or a later vendor release; read back the installed version on each endpoint. After the update, observe the branded-dictionary configuration request using HTTPS rather than HTTP. DNS monitoring alone cannot establish that the traffic was protected, because the old request remained vulnerable even when the official host offered HTTPS.

The CVE record’s CISA ADP enrichment selected Exploitation: none on November 4; ESET’s own investigation describes victim implants launched beginning July 1. For incident triage, use the observed endpoint evidence and investigate machines exposed before the upgrade. The fixed request stops this configuration substitution route on updated clients. Machines with a suspicious component or plugin still need response work, including examining what ran and restoring trusted application files.

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