Optimizely Project Scripts Served Wallet Clipper and Card Skimmer
Attacker-written code in Optimizely Web projects reached visitors through trusted snippets. Inspect Project JavaScript, including first-party-served copies.

Attacker-written JavaScript in Optimizely Web Experimentation projects reached visitors through the snippets that customer sites already trusted. StepSecurity traced the injected code across 178 organizations, including news, software, retail and banking sites. It found a wallet-address swapper, a checkout-card skimmer and an iOS second-stage loader. The 178 is a count of organizations with affected projects, not a count of visitors who lost funds or card details.
Optimizely says an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation and added malicious JavaScript to some customer projects. The company says it fixed the vulnerability, removed injected code, secured affected user accounts and added protections against unauthorized delivery. Its November 17 status update placed the incident in monitoring. Check your own projects and historical traffic even after the vendor cleanup.
Optimizely now says attackers abused its account signup flow to impersonate users on targeted customer accounts; it says this was not a credentials breach. Ask which accounts were impersonated and review their signup and project-change records alongside served snippets. Keep checking project access and tokens for unauthorized use; the vendor’s account finding does not clear visitor exposure.
The project field crossed sites
Optimizely Web customers load a project snippet, commonly from cdn.optimizely.com, to run experiments on their pages. The attacker wrote a loader into the project’s Project JavaScript field. The CDN delivered that customer-defined code under its ordinary host and certificate. Some customers serve the same project code from their own domains; StepSecurity cites affected first-party copies. This is why inspecting only site repository changes or only CDN-hosted snippets misses the altered field.
StepSecurity reports three loader forms: a direct reference to the payload host, a variant that decodes the destination with atob(), and an inline copy that could run when the external host was blocked. Search the actual Project JavaScript field of each project, including archived revisions if available. A text search for 1688360 in a served snippet will miss the encoded variant. Removing an external destination from a blocklist later cannot remove an inline copy already in a project.
Visitors faced different payload paths
The wallet block rewrote matching addresses in page content, inputs, copy events, the clipboard and some browser requests. StepSecurity says it acted on valid chain addresses near payment-related words. It also reports a screenshot and readable-cookie upload after a visible address swap; HttpOnly cookies remained outside JavaScript’s reach. Compare a payment address on a hardware wallet’s own screen with the intended recipient, rather than trusting text copied from an affected page.
A separate card block listened to form submits and browser requests for a valid card number, expiry and CVV, then sent matching fields to a collection endpoint. Cross-origin hosted payment fields kept their card values outside this page script’s reach. An iOS branch loaded further scripts; StepSecurity attributes identification of Coruna and DarkSword exploit chains to Scott Helme. Treat iPhone and iPad visits during the exposure window as a separate triage path, rather than equating a page visit with confirmed device compromise.
StepSecurity counted 76 public page scans across 30 domains that requested the payload host between 08:28 and 21:23 UTC on November 16. Seventeen of those domains had scans with a stored payload response. The report describes repeated payload changes that day. Its first captured file hash was 617df364120adc47fb4f55dcc0c69a9b6c9e108a92c60bc2b64a266254ab02f3, and its final-version hash was f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40. Match the host and browser behavior alongside either historical hash.
Trace projects and browser requests
For Optimizely Web teams, inventory every project and inspect Project JavaScript, its revision history and the snippet actually served from both vendor and first-party hosts. Ask Optimizely which projects and accounts were modified and when; review project users and API tokens for unauthorized access. Record the current field content and compare a fresh served snippet after remediation. The expected state is a clean project field and a served snippet without the loader or inline payload.
Search DNS, proxy, CSP reports and available browser telemetry back to 04:00 UTC on November 16. StepSecurity identified 1688360[.]cc as the payload host and attributed webshell[.]lol as an earlier injector through Helme’s analysis; its reported iOS-stage hosts were eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu, 1y69gy2mdzaltz1[.]icu, gm38duxoihbmy5o[.]icu, 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu, p55abnw2pnsz0bo[.]icu and l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icu. Historical IP leads are 136[.]113[.]106[.]136, 34[.]87[.]36[.]58 and 34[.]96[.]213[.]201; use domains and timing alongside shared-cloud IPs. Hunt separate path tokens /track.js, /hit.php and /card.php, with the browser artifact sessionStorage keys beginning cc_; correlate those generic paths with project changes, destination hosts and the exposure window. Block the reported destinations, while removing injected project code as the lasting fix.
Verify the customer-side cleanup
If your checkout used the affected project, investigate payment activity and contact the payment processor about exposed card entries; move card input to cross-origin hosted fields where possible. For staff who copied wallet destinations on an affected page, verify the intended address on a trusted device. Preserve browser, proxy and project-change evidence from the November 16 window before changing accounts or rotating project tokens. If iOS users visited an affected page, update their devices and assess them using your mobile incident process, especially devices on iOS 18.6 or earlier or iOS 17 and earlier. A clean live snippet establishes the present state; historical requests and project revisions guide the exposure response.
Updates
- : Optimizely says attackers abused its signup flow to impersonate customer users, not stolen credentials. Check signup and project-change records alongside existing snippet and visitor investigations.