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INFINITT PACS flaws expose imaging workstations to code execution

A writable update command list and an unsafe link handler affect System Manager. Inventory builds, inspect update and URI-launch traces, then upgrade.

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Illustration of a radiology workstation displaying a scan beside a software-update panel with one altered row.

A local user can alter an INFINITT PACS workstation’s update command list so an approved System Manager update may run their commands with administrative privileges after a User Account Control prompt. A separate flaw lets a crafted link invoke functions on the same medical-imaging workstation as the user who opens it. CERT/CC’s November 2 note names CVE-2026-16305 and CVE-2026-16306 and lists fixed System Manager builds 3.0.12.3 and 3.0.12.5.

INFINITT PACS stores and displays patient scans on medical-imaging workstations. CERT/CC says, “There are no indications that these vulnerabilities have been exploited.” Prioritize upgrades and check the manifest-write and user-opened-link paths separately for suspicious activity.

Update commands cross a privilege line

An application update has good reason to run privileged setup work. Here, the list of commands it will run is writable by a lower-privileged local user. The CERT/CC-assigned CVE record for CVE-2026-16305 calls the execlist.txt manifest world-writable and identifies SmartUpdate.exe and SmartExecute.exe as the affected executables. A local attacker who can change the manifest can place their own instructions where the updater expects its command list.

CERT/CC describes the order: after an update, SmartExecute.exe reads and runs commands from execlist.txt. SmartUpdate.exe launches it, and User Account Control can prompt the user. The elevation depends on that approved update and UAC path; merely having a low-privileged account does not make every workstation immediately run the added command. Once executed with administrative privileges, the commands could alter software, read protected files, disable security tools or establish persistence.

Look for a manifest change before a System Manager update, especially a write by an account that should have only ordinary workstation access. Correlate the file’s modification time and owner with update approval, UAC events if collected, and the SmartUpdate.exe to SmartExecute.exe process sequence in endpoint telemetry. A normal update can also produce the process sequence; the unexpected manifest writer is the more discriminating clue.

The second path starts at a registered imodular:// URI handler. The CERT/CC-assigned record for CVE-2026-16306 describes a remote, unauthenticated actor supplying a crafted link to invoke unintended application functions. CERT/CC says the user must be persuaded to open that link. IModular.exe then dispatches a function selected by a cmd value without checking whether the command is safe.

The handler can access attacker-controlled files or run programs from a local folder or network share. Its url parameter can also direct IModular.exe to an attacker-controlled SignalR endpoint, making an unauthorized outbound connection. Code execution here has the privileges of the affected user, unlike the update-manifest path’s possible administrative execution. The note describes possible access to that user’s data and further use of the workstation as a foothold.

For a PACS workstation, review IModular.exe launches associated with opened imodular:// links, its child processes, reads from network shares, and outbound SignalR connections to destinations outside the organization’s approved application endpoints. Preserve the initiating link and process tree in a restricted case record. A legitimate handler launch alone needs context: the parent process, user action, destination and subsequent file access tell the useful story.

Inventory builds before the change window

CERT/CC explicitly names affected System Manager builds 3.0.11.3 and 3.0.11.5. Both CVE records describe an affected custom range from 3.0.11.3 through 3.0.11.5. Check the installed System Manager build on PACS workstations and include any intermediate or custom build in the upgrade discussion with INFINITT support.

Start with workstations where ordinary users can reach the updater’s command manifest or where a browser or another application can invoke the registered handler. Ask the clinical application owner to confirm maintenance scheduling and approved SignalR destinations. Track both paths independently. A changed manifest can wait for update approval; a crafted link dispatches when the user opens it.

If an affected workstation shows an unexplained execlist.txt write around an update, or a suspicious IModular.exe launch followed by network-share access or an unapproved SignalR connection, preserve endpoint and network telemetry and investigate it as possible compromise.

Install the appropriate fixed build

INFINITT recommends fixed System Manager builds 3.0.12.3 and 3.0.12.5, according to CERT/CC. Arrange the appropriate update with the PACS owner, then read the installed build from each updated workstation. Compare the installed build with the fixed build for its supported branch; investigate any workstation still on an affected build. For intermediate or custom builds, ask INFINITT support to map the fixed branch before maintenance; CERT/CC has received no separate INFINITT vendor statement.

While the update is scheduled, limit write access to execlist.txt to the authorized update identity and review whether ordinary-user sessions need the registered URI handler. Constrain outbound connections from PACS workstations to approved clinical application destinations, after checking their normal workflow with the application owner.

The fixed build addresses the described software weaknesses. Keep earlier execution and connection history with the investigation record if suspicious activity preceded the update. Pair the installed-build check with the manifest writer and the handler’s actual outbound destinations.

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