DigiCert Traces Customer Archive Access to Unassigned Account
A network move exposed an internal archive; a self-registered account without an application assignment could still read customer records. Check both reachability and endpoint authorization.

An account with no assigned application read part of DigiCert’s archived customer information after a network migration exposed an internal business system to the internet. Customer representatives whose records were in that archive faced exposure of names, business email addresses, phone numbers and business addresses; a small minority of customer accounts also held a customer-provided identity or address document. DigiCert confirmed the access on October 19 and says it involved a small proportion of archived data.
The account had read-only access from June 27 through July 2, 2026. DigiCert says, “No certificate operations were impacted.” Its CA services, CertCentral and DigiCert ONE remained separate, and its review of CA and validation logs found no validation actions, issuance or revocations associated with the account. DigiCert says customer logins and issued certificates remained secure and customers need take no action concerning active certificates.
A network move exposed registration
In February 2025, DigiCert moved the archive system from a VPN-restricted network segment into an availability zone that allowed external access. The system used its own instance of an account manager also deployed for customer-facing products. Its self-service registration feature belonged to other implementations but was available on this business system. New self-registered accounts lacked the MFA applied to DigiCert staff, because MFA was enabled only for accounts assigned to an application that required it.
The unassigned accounts started in read-only mode, but the archive’s endpoints accepted an account-manager token without checking application assignment before returning data. The account could read archived records even though it could not write records, approve validations or issue certificates. In DigiCert’s account, network reachability, an unintended registration feature and endpoint authorization together made the archive accessible.
Nonstaff accounts preceded the finding
DigiCert’s internal team saw non-DigiCert accounts on June 18 and initially concluded that accounts without an application assignment had no data access. The system was moved behind a web application firewall, blocking new account creation from outside. A managed security program reported the registration path on June 21. The later investigation placed data access between June 27 and July 2, when DigiCert deployed an authorization restriction requiring internal endpoints to return 401 for unassigned accounts.
On October 12 DigiCert suspected that archived data had been accessed; on October 19 it confirmed the access window using retained file-access records and request volumes. DigiCert added application-level file-access and request-volume alerts in October and says its retained logs let it attribute activity to the account. DigiCert says the final review of alerts for unexpected account creation and permission changes is complete. It also says its internal audit found no externally accessible business-system origin server, completing its listed action items.
The report is public under Mozilla’s root-store incident policy, which requires CA operators to disclose and maintain incident reports. DigiCert offers root-program representatives summary statistics on request. Customers seeking their own exposure details should contact DigiCert through its customer support or incident channel.
Test the archive access boundary
If your organization operates an internal archive behind a shared account manager, review its network change records and externally reachable hostnames, including origins behind the WAF. Check whether self-registration is enabled on that instance and whether a new or unassigned account can read any archival endpoint. Review account-creation records alongside file-access and request-volume logs: DigiCert’s initial account review missed the data read because application assignment was mistaken for an authorization check.
Disable registration where the internal tool has no need for it, limit its origin and approved endpoints to private or VPN access, and make each data endpoint check application assignment and role. DigiCert reports moving remaining externally accessible endpoints to private-IP load balancers and internal hostnames and completing an endpoint-by-endpoint permissions review. Verify the repaired boundary with an external reachability scan and an authorized test account without an application assignment: the archival endpoint should return 401, while the scan should find no public origin. Those checks test present access; retained file-access and request-volume records are what let operators investigate earlier reads.
Updates
- : DigiCert reports completing its internal audit of business-system origin exposure and its listed incident action items.