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Attackers Exploit Confluence Remote API Flaw to Run Code

Rapid7 saw exploitation of an Axis SOAP flaw in Confluence Data Center. Check the optional Remote API, upgrade affected servers and investigate exposed instances.

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A paper message enters the drawer of a large documentation server in a quiet IT room.

Attackers exploited a flaw in the old SOAP interface of Atlassian Confluence Data Center in a customer environment on November 13, according to Rapid7’s managed detection team. The weakness, CVE-2026-90436, can let an unauthenticated remote party run code through Apache Axis 1.x. Confluence installations in the affected version range become vulnerable when the optional Remote API (XML-RPC & SOAP) setting is enabled.

The exposed setting decides who needs an emergency response. CISA added CVE-2026-90436 to KEV on November 18; NVD lists November 21 as the action date for covered federal agencies. The listing does not change the optional-API exposure condition for Confluence or N-central. Rapid7 says Confluence Data Center 1.x through 9.x is affected with that API enabled; the feature has been off by default for new installations since 3.0. Atlassian Cloud is unaffected, and Confluence 10.x removed the feature. Rapid7’s advice is direct: “Rapid7 recommends remediating exposed systems on an emergency basis outside of normal patching cycles.”

Axis parses faults before authentication

Apache’s CVE record identifies the underlying defect as unsafe reflection in Axis 1.x through 1.4. Axis handles SOAP messages for Java web services. When it reads an incoming fault, it can load an attacker-named class and instantiate it before checking whether that object is the expected fault type. Class loading alone can run initialization code. With a suitable class already on the application’s classpath, that behavior permits remote code execution. The record credits José Apari-Pantigozo of OKIOK with finding the vulnerability.

The ordering is the dangerous part. Axis parses the fault while resolving the target service, ahead of the service’s handler chain. Authentication configured at that service layer therefore cannot stop this request path. NIST’s vulnerability record carries Apache’s description and a 9.8 CVSS v3.1 score supplied by CISA. The score describes technical severity; Rapid7’s November 13 detection supplies the evidence of exploitation against Confluence.

Which Confluence servers need attention

Start with internet-accessible Confluence Data Center servers, then check internally reachable installations. Read the installed release and the exact Remote API (XML-RPC & SOAP) setting under General Configuration → Further Configuration. An installation in 1.x through 9.x with the setting enabled has the exposure Rapid7 describes. Record whether that interface was reachable during the period under investigation. Review configuration history for prior enablement, including servers where the setting is currently off.

Rapid7 separately reports that N-able described exploitation against N-central on November 13 for a vulnerability it says strongly correlates with this Axis issue. N-central requires its own non-default Legacy API to be enabled for this exposure. Administrators of on-premises N-central should confirm that setting is disabled, including on 2026.4 HF2; Rapid7’s November 17 update says N-central 2026.4 HF3 (2026.4.1.39) is released and disables the vulnerable Legacy API feature. Upgrade on an emergency basis and verify the setting afterward. Check N-central as a separate product with its own Legacy API setting.

Rapid7’s addresses guide investigation

For a Confluence server that exposed the API, search access, reverse-proxy and security logs for the four addresses Rapid7 associates with observed Confluence exploitation: 192.238.253[.]176, 5.133.47[.]243, 163.182.68[.]109 and 104.13.106[.]166. Preserve relevant server logs and investigate suspicious requests and resulting process activity as possible compromise.

Rapid7’s November 17 investigation found unauthenticated POST requests to /plugins/servlet/soap-axis1/confluenceservice-v2 returning HTTP 500 while the Confluence Java process launched Bash and curl as the service account. Correlate the request and child process even when the HTTP response is an error; inspect subsequent database, attachment and connected-account access. An attacker can use other infrastructure, so an address-only search leaves a blind spot.

N-able’s N-central indicators, as relayed by Rapid7, are 157.20.241[.]16, 139.99.69[.]109 and 79.76.51[.]56. Search for those addresses in N-central logs; use the four Confluence-associated addresses above for the Confluence investigation. A match calls for investigation; a clean match list still leaves an exposed instance to assess.

Disable the API or upgrade

For affected Confluence Data Center, upgrade to the fixed 9.2.28 release or a current unaffected 10.x release. If the upgrade must wait, clear Remote API (XML-RPC & SOAP) in General Configuration → Further Configuration and save. Rapid7 says the change takes effect without a restart; integrations that depend on the legacy API may stop working. Read the setting back after saving and verify those integrations with their owners. Keep investigating any instance that exposed the interface before the change.

Apache considers Axis 1.x end of life and expects no fixed 1.x release. For applications that use Axis directly, Apache recommends a different SOAP engine such as Axis 2/Java, or an Axis build with its published patch applied. For Confluence, follow the product-specific upgrade and setting guidance above. Confirm the installed release and saved API state on each server; then use the preserved logs to decide whether a previously exposed server needs incident response as well as remediation.

Updates

  • : Rapid7 now reports N-central 2026.4 HF3 is released and disables Legacy API; it also details Confluence requests returning HTTP 500 while Java launched child processes.
  • : CISA added CVE-2026-90436 to KEV on November 18; NVD lists a November 21 federal action date. Verify the optional API setting and remediate exposed systems.

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